Massimo Morelli


Professor of Political Science and Economics
Bocconi University

Fellow of Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Fellow of the Econometric Society, Research Fellow at Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER), and Baffi Carefin Center, director of the Pericles unit.


Office: Via Roentgen 1, 3-b1-06
Phone: +39 02 58365495
Email: massimo.morelli [at] unibocconi.it


Curriculum Vitae


My research interests are in game theory, mechanism design, political economy, governance institutions, development economics, behavioral and public economics, comparative politics and international relations.

Massimo Morelli, Profile Picture

Selected Publications

Political Analysis (2020): Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to US States (with Matia Vannoni, Elliott Ash)

Journal of Political Economy (2019): Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization (with Adam Meirowitz, Kris Ramsay and Francesco Squintani), Vol. 127(1), 378-418

Journal of Political Economy (2019): Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation: a Correction (with Margherita Negri), Vol. 127(1), 458-462

Economic Policy (2019): Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions (with Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera and Tommaso Sonno)

American Journal of Political Science (2016): Turnout Across Democracies (with Helios Herrera and Salvatore Nunnari), Vol. 60(3), 607-24

Review of Economic Studies (2015): Mediation and Peace (with Johannes Horner and Francesco Squintani), Vol. 82, 1483-501

Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015): The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (with Francesco Caselli and Dominic Rohner) Vol 130-1, pp. 267-315

Journal of Political Economy (2015): Strategic Mass Killings (with Joan Esteban and Dominic Rohner), Vol. 123-5; International Geneva Award winner 2015

American Journal of Political Science (2008): Incumbents' Interests and Gender Quotas (with Francois Maniquet and Guillaume R. Fréchette) Vol. 52-4, 891-909

American Economic Review (2007): Political Bias and War (with Matthew O. Jackson), Vol. 97-4, 1353-73

American Economic Review (2006): Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations (with Giovanni Maggi), Vol. 96-4, 1137-58; also reprinted in Public International Law (November 2010), edited by Eric A. Posner, Elgar Publishing

Econometrica (2005): Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: an Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers (with Guillaume Fréchette and John Kagel), Vol. 73-6, 1893-939

Review of Economic Studies (2004): Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems Vol. 71-3, 829-53

Review of Economic Studies (2001): Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives (with Maitreesh Ghatak and Tomas Sjostrom), Vol. 68-4, 781-810

American Political Science Review (1999): Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining Vol. 93-4, 809-20


Working Papers

Economic Insecurity and the Demand of Populism in Europe (with Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera and Tommaso Sonno)

Populism: Demand and Supply (with Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera and Tommaso Sonno), CEPR Discussion Paper 11871 (covered in Economist, Corriere della Sera, Sette)

From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and Overproduction of Laws (with Gabriele Gratton, Luigi Guiso and Claudio Michelacci)

Complexity and the Reform Process (with Dana Foarta)

Identity, Patience and War: A Dynamic Theory of Secessionist vs Centrist Conflict (with Joan Esteban, Sabine Flamand and Dominic Rohner)

Electoral Systems, Taxation and Immigration Policies (with Margherita Negri), CEPR DP 12212

Corruption and Extremism (with Antonio Nicolo’ and Tommaso Giommoni)

Third Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization (forthcoming on the QJPS) (with Adam Meirowitz, Kris Ramsay and Francesco Squintani)

Mobilization and the Strategy of Populism: Theory and Evidence from US Elections (with Giampaolo Lecce and Gloria Gennaro)

A Theory of Power Wars (with Helios Herrera and Salvatore Nunnari)

Optimal Checks and Balances under Policy Uncertainty (with Gabriele Gratton)

Populism and War (with Andrea Mattozzi and Marcos Y. Nakaguma)

Bureaucrats under Populism (with Greg Sasso)

The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities (with Luca Bellodi, Matia Vannoni)

More Laws, More Growth? Evidence from U.S. States (with Elliott Ash and Matia Vannoni)

A Commitment Theory of Populism (with Antonio Nicolas and Paolo Roberti)